University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law

DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law
Faculty Scholarship

Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty

2004

The Cost of Conscience: Quantifying our Charitable Burden in an
Era of Globalization
Frank A. Pasquale
University of Maryland Francis King Carey School of Law, fpasquale@law.umaryland.edu

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs
Part of the Growth and Development Commons

Digital Commons Citation
Pasquale, Frank A., "The Cost of Conscience: Quantifying our Charitable Burden in an Era of Globalization"
(2004). Faculty Scholarship. 1368.
https://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/fac_pubs/1368

This Working Paper is brought to you for free and open access by the Francis King Carey School of Law Faculty at
DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship by an authorized
administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.

The Cost of Conscience:
Quantifying our Charitable Burden in an Era of Globalization
Frank Pasquale
Draft (August 24, 2004)
I. Introduction……………………………………………………………………..1
II. Anxieties of Affluence: The Positions of Singer, Unger, and Cohen………..5
A. Singer’s Principle of Obligation: Tithing Ethics
B. Unger’s Principle of Obligation: The Moral Equivalent of War
C. G.A. Cohen: A Limited Defense of the “Rich Egalitarian”
1) Excuses for Not Giving: The Supererogatory Nature of Charity
a) The Mental Burden of Self-Taxation
b) Relative Deprivation in the Peer Group
c) Absolute Deprivation: Expensive or Expansive Tastes?
2) Justifications for Not Giving: The Irrelevance of Charity
a) “My Giving Would be a Drop in the Ocean”
b) The Real Problem is Unequal Power
3) Reasons for Keeping: The Self-Defeat of the Charitable Impulse?
a) The First Paradox of Charity: Impeding the Market Mechanisms that
“Lift all Boats?”
b) The Second Paradox of Charity: Destroying Indigenous Cultures While
Inducing Dependence?
D) A Summary of the Lessons of Singer, Unger, and Cohen
III. The Remaining Critiques: Material Needs of Dependents and
Incommensurable Aspirations………………………………………………28
A) The Material Needs of Dependents
1) The Limits of Children’s Obligations to Parents: An Investment Theory
2) The Limits of Parents’ Obligations to Children: An Opportunity Theory
3) Deliberative Preconditions for Moral Choice
B) Incommensurable Immaterial Aspirations

1

1) Utilitarianism and Time: Ignoring the Value of One’s Non-Charitable
Experience for Oneself
2) Utilitarianism as Reductionism: Ignoring the Value of One’s Non-Charitable
Contributions to the Community
3) From the sophistry of the reductio ad absurdum to a ethical responsibility
IV. Realizing Tithing Ethics: Toward an Ethics of Consumption………………...41
V. Conclusion…………………………………………………………………………45

2

The Cost of Conscience:
Quantifying our Charitable Burden in an Era of Globalization
Who that cares much to know the history of man…has not dwelt, at least briefly,
on the life of Saint Theresa? Theresa's passionate, ideal nature demanded an epic
life…[and] she found her epos in the reform of a religious order. [But] [m]any
Theresas have been born who found for themselves no epic life wherein there was
a constant unfolding of far-resonant action; perhaps only a life of mistakes, the
offspring of a certain spiritual grandeur ill-matched with the meanness of
opportunity…. With dim lights and tangled circumstance they tried to shape their
thought and deed in noble agreement; but…were helped by no coherent social
faith and order which could perform the function of knowledge for the ardently
willing soul.
--George Eliot, Middlemarch
When he was twenty-nine, Albert Schweitzer was about to engage in a promising
career as a theologian and preacher. The young Schweitzer had committed himself to
what, he then thought, were the highest things—a life of contemplation and moral
teaching. But he was also troubled by his decision. He reflected in his autobiography
that, “[w]hile at the University and enjoying the happiness of being able to study and
even to produce some results in science and art, I could not help thinking continually of
others who were denied that happiness by their material circumstances or their health.”1
He resolved that he “must not accept this happiness as a matter of course, but must give
something in return for it.”2 And at that point he made his famous commitment, “to
consider myself justified in living till I was thirty for science and art, in order to devote
myself from that time forward to the direct service of humanity.”3 He thereafter
committed himself to medical service in Equatorial Africa.

1

Albert Schweitzer, OUT OF MY LIFE AND THOUGHT, as anthologized in PILGRIM SOULS: A
OF SPIRITUAL AUTOBIOGRAPHIES (Amy Mandelker and Elizabeth Powers, eds.), 2000.

2
3

id.
Id.
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COLLECTION

Schweitzer is an exemplar—a paragon of self-sacrifice. As Susan Wolf argues, it
is unwise to make “moral saints” the measure of our ethical aspirations.4 But his example
still exerts moral pull—as a beacon of compassion we might reflect imperfectly in our
own lives. For who among us can simply ignore the plight of the poorest? What
American can reflectively believe he deserves the affluence he is born into?5 Like the
healthy person shamed into quiet moroseness by the close presence of a dying relation,6
are we not called upon to temper our enjoyment of this world’s plenty with some
awareness of the third world’s scarcity?7 Isn’t sharing more, more than a supererogatory
duty?8
Whatever the present merits of these emotional responses as apprehensions of
moral duty, they are becoming more plausible given the collapse of traditional political
mechanisms of mutual aid. As Robert Kaplan has documented, "scarcity, crime,
overpopulation, and disease are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet."9 With
the collapse of state institutions in afflicted regions, humanitarian interventions from nongovernmental organizations offered the best hope for many troubled regions. The
corruption of recipient "governments" and lack of funding for NGO's present the chief
obstacles to these interventions. Thankfully, the World Bank is fighting corruption in
order to enable NGO’s to provide immediate relief and to rebuild institutions of self-

4

Wolf, Moral Saints, J. Phil. 1980.
Cf. Hilary Putnam, “All men are brothers,” (in collection on genetic engineering/Oxford Amnesty
Lectures 1999)
6
See, e.g,, Proust at beginning of Remembrance of Things Past (near his sick aunt); David Leavitt’s
protagonist in Equal Affections.
7
Such memento mori’s appear in several cultural traditions, such as the breaking of a glass at many Jewish
weddings.
8
For an attack on the notion of supererogatory duties, see J. Raz, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM.
9
Atlantic Article.
5
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sufficiency. But how can NGO's do the work of governments when they lack the power
to tax? Can new norms generate income when laws cannot?
Philosophers, theologians, and human rights activists have tried to generate such
norms. They have addressed the personal responsibility of the well-off for the welfare of
citizens of less developed countries.10 The United Nations Development Program has
long announced targets for foreign aid contributions from wealthy countries. But
philosophers like Peter Singer, Peter Unger, and G.A. Cohen suggest that these countries'
citizens have a parallel moral responsibility to tithe a portion of their income directly for
the relief of the poorest. Whereas Singer and Unger present strictly utilitarian arguments
to this effect,11 Cohen explores a variety of ethical frameworks which could demand such
a result.
All these thinkers would prefer a systematic global redistribution of income—
some public mechanism for accomplishing worldwide what the tax systems of egalitarian
social democratic states accomplish. But they all realize that such global governance is
unlikely to come about in any of our lifetimes. So they turn their attention to
individuals—Singer and Unger to persons generally, and Cohen to “rich egalitarians”
who share his political concerns and lifestyle. All believe that giving more to the poor is
not simply “supererogatory”—i.e., “something beyond duty that it would be especially
admirable to do.”12 They have begun to quantify a moral obligation of charitable support.
And though the amount suggested is much higher in the case of Unger and Singer than

10

Barry and Satz on shift to cosmopolitan notion of justice in Global Justice. Brian Barry argues that:
“individuals, rather than corporate entities of any sort—be they families, communities, or nations—are the
appropriate subjects for all claims about justice.” Id., 3.
11
Utilitarianism is a consequentialist maximizing welfarism. Sen, Choice Welfare, and Measurement.
12
Cohen, 178.
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that of Cohen, all three thinkers advance principles which could significantly impact the
way we think about charity.
Like Schweitzer, these thinkers would have us believe that we are obliged in some
way to systematically care for those much worse off. But unlike Schweitzer, they do not
ground these duties in an ecumenically religious ethic of Reverence for Life. Rather,
they present strictly philosophical arguments. Singer and Unger systematically compare
our behavior in a variety of situations and infer duties from the comparison. If we would
spend $500 to rescue a dying person by the side of the road, why not $50 to feed
someone about to starve in Africa? Cohen provides less systematic but more nuanced
reflections on the same problem in his Gifford Lectures. He asks about the relationship
between personal behavior and political philosophy—and the necessary cost of espousing
egalitarian beliefs.
Although Singer has gotten a great deal of media attention,13 and Unger has been
praised by Richard Posner as perhaps the only recent moral philosopher to seriously
aspire to moral entrepreneurship,14 neither of these thinkers has been well-received by the
wider public. This is not simply a matter of public obliviousness to the very serious
issues each of them raises. Rather, the writers themselves avoid many of the hardest
questions their approaches suggest. Neither of the utilitarians convincingly draws a line
between necessity, convenience, and luxury—essential distinctions for those urging
others to rethink their “unnecessary” consumption. Cohen is more subtle, but he too does
not adequately concretize his proposed ethical framework.

13

Mostly negative, focusing on what he deems permissible (killing disabled babies) as opposed to what he
deems mandatory (such as giving away a great deal of one’s money.
14
Problematics lecture and book. Citing her own savage critique of Unger, Nussbaum singles out this
praise as particularly worthy of ridicule.
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Can their arguments for obligation be pushed further? I believe that Cohen and
the utilitarians have proven our moral obligation to donate a portion of our income to
NGO’s serving the world’s poorest. But their deliberate eschewal of virtue ethics leaves
them ill-equipped to tell us how much is necessary. Wishing to avoid the absolute claims
of a Jesus or a Buddha, they leave their proposals unspecified. But I believe this gap is
unnecessary, and indeed must be filled with an ethic of consumption and charity in order
to give their ideas real weight and force. There is some middle ground between the
saintly rigor of an Elie Wiesel (who has said that "our lives belong to those who need
them most") and the unreflective materialism so common in developed countries. The
financial health of NGO's depends on the ability of the well-off to articulate such an
ethic, and to act on it.
II. Anxieties of Affluence: The Positions of Singer, Unger, and Cohen
A. Singer’s Principle of Obligation: Tithing Ethics
In an issue devoted to investment tips for doctors, the editors of the magazine
Medical Economics asked “Is it possible to quantify our charitable burden?”15 Having
provided financial experts to advise on the proper level of personal investment and
savings, they turned to philosopher Peter Singer for guidance on giving. Singer
mercifully foregoes the schematic hypotheticals with which he usually opens such
essays.16 He instead turns our attention to a critically acclaimed Brazilian film—Central
Station.

15

Peter Singer, Why you should give away most of your money, MEDICAL ECONOMICS, November 8, 1999,
275.
16
See Practical Ethics, Cambridge University Press, 1993.
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Simplifying radically, but still capturing the gist of the story, Singer tells of the
dilemma faced by the film’s protagonist, Dora. Dora is a middle-aged messenger and
letter-writer who leads an impoverished but secure life. One day, she is offered $1000 to
accompany a young boy to an “adoption agency.” She buys a few small luxuries with the
money (her first TV set, some cosmetics). But a neighbor cuts short her jubilation by
letting her know that the boy is likely too old to be adopted—and that such “agencies”
often kill their charges in order to sell their organs on the black market. After some
agonizing, Dora “redeems herself” by rescuing the boy from the agency.
Singer notes that though most viewers in affluent societies “would have been
quick to condemn Dora if she had not rescued the boy,” they daily ignore less onerous
opportunities for saving lives. There are nearly a billion people in the world who now
live in absolute poverty.17 There are well-organized and efficient relief agencies capable
of helping more of them—if only they had more funding. Meanwhile, “the average
family in the United States spends almost one-third of its income on things that are no
more necessary to them than Dora's new TV was to her.”18 Had Central Station really
mirrored our moral lives, Singer suggests, Dora would have stayed and home and
watched TV.
Singer concedes that one can draw distinctions between Dora’s behavior and our
own—for example, the gap between acts and omissions.19 He concedes that Dora was
directly involved in the child’s plight—she gained by putting him in harm’s way. But he
17

As Singer defines it in Practical Ethics (using terms employed by the World Bank), “Absolute poverty is
the lack of sufficient income in cash or kind to meet the most basic biological needs for food, clothing, and
shelter.” PE, 220.
18
Medical Economics article, 277. Singer’s examples include “Going out to nice restaurants, buying new
clothes because the old ones are no longer stylish, vacationing at beach resorts--so much of our income is
spent on things not essential to the preservation of our lives and health.” Id.
19
For a good recent critique of that distinction, see Sunstein, The Partial Constitution. But see F. Schauer,
Acts, Omissions, and Constitutionalism (Ethics).
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notes that, for a utilitarian philosopher, history doesn’t matter—what matters are the
consequences of our actions. And he notes that the consequences of a rich individual
failing to give are not much different from the consequences of a Dora who failed to
rescue. In the same manner, Singer dismisses a number of other distinctions as “missing
the point.” Certainly there are “practical uncertainties about whether aid will really reach
the people who need it”—but Singer assures us that, with a little research, we can easily
find agencies standing at the front lines of need. He even gives their phone numbers.20
Singer’s reflections on Central Station apply a moral principle he articulated long
ago: “If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby
sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, we ought to do it…”21 (I shall
heretofore refer to this idea as “Singer’s Principle of Obligation.”) Singer lists a number
of everyday consumption choices—from new clothing to dining out—that are not as
morally significant as improving the lives of the poor. He notes that, while his principle
appears uncontroversial, “If it were taken seriously and acted upon, our lives would and
our world would be fundamentally changed.” When asked to quantify our charitable
obligations in a public interview, he proposed that nearly everyone should give away
nearly everything they make above $30,000.
Singer’s philosophical reflections and practice are more measured. He gives onefifth of his income to charity.22 His first article on the topic acknowledged that “any
figure would be arbitrary, but there may be something to be said for a round percentage
20

According to his research, “Three million children die each year of dehydrating diarrhea, and this can be
prevented with packets of oral rehydration salts that cost a mere 15 cents a packet; with a few of these and
some necessary overheads we can each save a life for well under $5.”
21
PE 229.
22
Although Singer gives 20% of his income to charity, he still “indulges” in many of the luxuries his book
theoretically condemns. Peter Berkowitz, Other People's Mothers: The utilitarian horrors of Peter Singer,
THE NEW REPUBLIC,(Jan. 10, 2000, 27
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of one’s income like, say, 10 per cent.” This position is more convincing, not simply
because it is less, but because it is rooted in tradition. As Singer notes, the 10% figure is
“reminiscent of the ancient tithe, or tenth, that was traditionally given to the church,
whose responsibilities included care of the poor in one’s local community.” He argues
that this “idea can be revived and applied to the global community.”23
Of course, the few Christians nominally obliged to tithe rarely do so,24 and Singer
presents us with little reason to believe that the arguments he just offered will do much to
increase general levels of giving. As we will see in the next section, although there are a
number of respectable critiques of Singer’s principle of obligation, his most important
shortcoming is his failure to give a convincing account of moral motivation. Pace
Socrates, we may know what is right and fail to do it.
B. Unger’s Principle of Obligation: The Moral Equivalent of War
Peter Unger tries to fill this gap in moral motivation by aggressively expanding
Singer’s position in Living and High and Letting Die: Our Illusion of Innocence. Singer
concludes his Medical Economics article by praising Unger for presenting “an ingenious
series of imaginary examples designed to probe our intuitions about whether it is wrong
to live well without giving substantial amounts of money to help people who are hungry,
malnourished, or dying from easily treatable illnesses like diarrhea.” Unger believes that
it is. After systematically considering moral objections to Singer’s Principle of
Obligation, he argues that not just giving to but stealing for the poor may be a morally
necessary response to current inequalities.

23
24

PE 233.
See Ronsvalle on denominations where this is doctrinally required. www.emptytomb.org
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Whereas Singer’s hypotheticals are usually schematic, Unger deploys a range of
complex stories to explore moral judgments of our conduct. One of Unger’s key
hypotheticals follows:
Bob’s Bugatti: On a rural road near the garage where it’s kept, Bob’s gone for a
careful drive in his Bugatti. At a certain point, he spies a shiny object. To inspect it,
Bob parks his car…ten yards beyond a trolley track…[W]hen Bob walksl over to the
shiny object, he finds it’s a switch that can be set in two ways. And, as Bob observes,
there’s a trolley up the line that’s barreling toward the switch’s fork. As the shiny
switch is set, the trolley will go down the fork’s opposite side, not the branch leading
to…Bob’s Bugatti. But, as Bob sees, on that side there’s a young child trapped on the
track. As he knows, Bob has two options: if he does nothing about the situation, the
child will be killed, but he’ll enjoy a comfortable retirement [given the rising value of
the car]. If he changes the switch’s setting, then, while nobody’s killed…the trolley
will totally destroy Bob’s uninsurable Bugatti, wiping out his entire retirement fund.
Bob chooses the first option and, while the child is killed, he has a comfortable
retirement.25
Unger notes that “everyone responds that Bob’s conduct was monstrous.” But we
respond differently to another hypothetical where the demand on the actor is less and the
resulting harm is much greater. For, after discussing “Ray’s Big Request from UNICEF”
(a hypothetical wherein the multimillionaire Ray is asked to give half his fortune to
“efficient life-saving programs), Unger notes that few of us would condemn Ray for
refusing the request. But Unger suggests that, each time we fail to sacrifice some of our
disposable income for the relief of the poorest, both we and Ray are acting like Bob—that
the two cases are ultimately indistinguishable.
Most of us would find such an equation intuitively implausible. But like Mill’s
attack on the intuitionist Whewell in Utilitarianism, Unger’s work challenges the
foundations of these moral beliefs. For Unger, “all too often, our moral intuitions about
cases are generated not by the basic moral values we hold, but by psychological

25

Unger, LIVING HIGH AND LETTING DIE: OUR ILLUSION OF INNOCENCE (1996), 136.
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dispositions that prevent us from acting in accord with our deep moral commitments.”
Unger believes that there is something deeply wrong with the method of “reflective
equilibrium” that has come to dominate moral philosophy.26 In his chapter “Metaethics,
Better Ethics: From Complex Semantics to Simple Decency,” Unger argues that
intuitions are only valid when the intuiting person is “aware of what’s most morally
relevant.”27
For Unger, the existence of absolute poverty is inescapably among the most
morally relevant aspects of our lives. The mere spatial distance between a dying person
in Ethiopia and one on your doorstep makes little difference.28 After discussing “hot
spots” of greatest global need, Unger observes that, “If you’d contributed $100 to one of
UNICEF’s most efficient lifesaving programs a couple months ago, this month there’d be
over thirty fewer children who, instead of painfully dying soon, would live reasonably
long lives.”29 Most people financially capable of such a donation do not give the money,
and believe that there is nothing seriously wrong with failing to do so.30 But Unger
concludes with his “Pretty Demanding Dictate:” "On pain of living a life that's seriously
immoral, a typical well-off person, like you and me, must give away most of her

26

[Describe Method: Rawls S. 9]
159.
28
See also JJC Smart, “An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics,” in Utilitarianism: For and Against,
63. (on generalized versus localized benevolence).
29
8.
30
As Unger notes: “In a typical year, 1993, the US Committee for UNICEF mailed out, almost every
month, informative appeals to over 450,000 potential donors. As a Committee staffer informed me, the
prospects were folks whose recorded behavior selected them as well above the national average in
responding to humanitarian appeals. With only a small overlap between the folks in each mailing, during
the year over 4 million ‘charitable’ Americans were vividly informed about what just a few of their dollars
would mean. With each mailing, a bit less than 1% donated anything, a pattern persisting year after year.”
Unger, 7
27
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financially valuable assets, and much of her income, directing the funds to lessen
efficiently the serious suffering of others."31
Stated as such, Unger’s position sounds little different than Singer’s. But by
considering at length the implications of following it through, Unger proposes priorities
of responsibility that are far more concrete. For example, one of the chief shortcomings
of Singer’s Principle of Obligation is that it fails to give any content to the idea of moral
significance.32 What I call Unger’s Principle of Obligation remedies this deficiency to
some extent by explicitly considering (what is for most of us) the most important rival
claim on our resources—our family. According to Unger’s principle, “Insofar as they
need her help to have a decent chance for decent lives, a person must do a great deal for
those few people, like her highly dependent children, to whom she has the most serious
sort of special moral obligation. Insofar as it’s compatible with that, which is often very
considerably indeed, and sometimes when it’s not so compatible, she must do a lot for
other innocent folks in need, so that they may have a decent chance for decent lives.”33 I
consider in more detail the demands of relations in Section IV below.
Unger pushes Singer’s utilitarian position to its limits. He criticizes anyone who
takes vacations or engages in other “luxury spending” because they're depriving the poor
of these funds. While Singer circumscribes his discussion to persons’ management of
their own lives, Unger recommends that his readers steal from wealthy persons if that
stealing would, on balance, relieve suffering. Unger presents the duty to relieve absolute

31

140.
:Singer’s principle: “If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from happening, without thereby
sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, we ought to do it…” Singer asserts that “I have left
the idea of moral significance unexamined in order to show that the argument does not depend on any
specific values or ethical principles.” (231).
33
Unger, 12.
32
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poverty as an absolute—the moral equivalent of war. As such, the ends justifies
whatever means necessary to achieve them.
Singer takes as a baseline his readers’ present careers and social positions. Unger
thinks these, too, are obliged to change if they do not presently reflect the demands of his
principle. He claims that nearly all corporate law professors are immoral, because they
could relieve suffering more by maximizing their salary at a law firm and then donating
it.34 He encourages young philosophers to get out of the field in order to make more
money, again to donate to the poorest.35
I have come across no academics willing to support these extreme positions. One
cleric who suggested similar “Robin Hood” proposals in England recently was
universally condemned. Nevertheless, Unger’s main arguments deserve notice and a
more serious hearing. Although not directly addressed in G.A. Cohen’s If You’re An
Egalitarian, How Come You’re So Rich, Unger’s philosophical position is a profound
influence on Cohen’s nuanced and qualified defense of the “rich egalitarian” in that work.
C) G.A. Cohen: A Limited Defense of the “Rich Egalitarian”
Cohen suggests a “back-handed” defense of Singer’s position that may contain
Unger’s extremism. He does so by considering excuses and justifications that a nongiving egalitarian could offer in defense of his inaction. Cohen wants to explore “what
justice demands of individuals in an unjust society,” particularly those who recognize the
society’s injustice.36 He asks “whether egalitarians who live in an unequal society….are
committed to implementing, so far as they can, in their own lives, the norm of equality
34

This does show the problem with the “it will cause global depression” argument…in fact, her he counsels
that we work harder.
35
Cf. Ray Monk, Wittgenstein.
36
G.A. Cohen, IF YOU’RE AN EGALITARIAN, HOW COME YOU’RE SO RICH? [Gifford Lectures 1998]
[Harvard University Press, 2000] 149.
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that they prescribe for the government.”37 Throughout the essay he entertains arguments
for and against the proposition that a wealthy person is morally bound to give away at
least some of his wealth to ease their plight.
Cohen claims that the rich egalitarian can defend his practices in three ways.
“Within the general category of justifications38 for not performing action X (here, X is
yielding up one’s riches), one can distinguish between those that (1) make it wrong to do
X and those that (2) make X neither obligatory nor wrong. One can, moreover,
distinguish, within the latter subcategory, between justifications that (2a) do, and those
that (2b) do not, make X ‘supererogatory’--something beyond duty that it would be
especially admirable to do.”39 Cohen considers five arguments of the type 2b variety,
three of the type 2a variety, and a three of the type 1 variety—i.e., claims that such giving
is simply wrong. I will consider Cohen’s responses to each of these “defenses” of the
rich egalitarian in reverse order, ranging from the mildest to the strongest.40
1) Excuses for Not Giving: The Supererogatory Nature of Charity
Cohen notes that many egalitarians are quick to distinguish between “what states
of affairs a person thinks are good and what obligations he has to promote those states of
affairs.”41 For instance, Thomas Nagel believes that while the results of charity are
generally good, there is no duty to be charitable. Nagel argues that it is “acceptable to
compel people to contribute to the support of the indigent by automatic taxation, but
unreasonable to insist in the absence of such a system they ought to contribute

37

149.
cf. Austin, excuses
39
Cf. Raz (against the supererogatory?)
40
(The numbering above does not map to the numbering below.)
41
160.
38
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voluntarily….”42 Nagel claims that “this is partly due to lack of assurance that others
would do likewise and fear of relative disadvantage; but it is also a sensible rejection of
excessive demands on the will, which can be more irksome than automatic demands on
the purse.”43 Cohen deals with each of these two arguments, which he calls
(respectively) the “mental burden” concern and the “relative disadvantage” problem.
While Cohen finds the first argument specious, he lends a bit too much credence to the
“relative disadvantage” problem, and to a cognate concerns about the welfare of those
with “expensive tastes.”
a) The Mental Burden of Self-Taxation
Nagel’s position may make sense if, as a matter of pure theory, we are, ex ante,
trying to choose between a regime of taxation (allocated to NGO’s) and a regime of
private support. His realism is a needed corrective to the libertarian fetishization of the
voluntary—and to the religious hope of moral improvement via self-sacrifice.44 For
sacrifice means not only making holy, but also gving up something important.45 When
that giving up is part of the background of expectations,] it takes less moral energy to
accept than when it must be done sua sponte.
But as a matter of applied moral theory, Nagel’s argument is unconvincing.
Cohen reflects on the mental burden argument by revisiting an ancient dispute in Greek
philosophy. While Socrates “thought it was impossible to do intentionally what you
think it wrong to do,” Aristotle recognized the problem of akrasia, or weakness of will.46
42

Thomas Nagel, “Libertarianism Without Foundations,” in Jeffrey Paul, ed., Reading Nozick (1981), 199200, qtd. in Cohen, 169.
43
Id., 169.
44
As theological historian Boniface Ramsey notes.. ‘almsgiving was characterized les as a work whose
motivation is the alleviation of social ills than as a profoundly spiritual exercise…’ In Wagner.
45
Anne Carson, “Frusta” (notes to play Invention of Love)
46
155.
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Although akrasia is a complex fact of our psychological makeup, it is by no means a
norm to be valued. With automatic bank drafts, “giving off one’s own bat and the state’s
just taking” are almost equally easy to do.47 And given that one knows precisely where
one’s funds are destined in the former case, it ought in fact be easier to do, since results
can be more directly monitored.
2) Relative Disadvantage in One’s Peer Group
Nagel’s second objection is more difficult. If all of one’s friends and neighbors
were to join in the project, engaged in common sacrifice, the worry over falling out of
one’s peer group would of course disappear. But what if, in the process of giving, I
impoverish myself relative to my friends? What if I can no longer go out to dinner with
them, or join them on vacations? More pointedly, what about my children? Am I to
subject them to a second class public school system because I am devoted to the poor?48
As Cohen notes, serious giving can “severely prejudice [the givers’] self-interest and,
more poignantly, the interest of members of their families.”49 For this reason, many a
“rich egalitarian” claims that he “should not be asked to depart from the observable norm
of his peer group—a peer group to which…he continues to belong even if he
impoverishes himself, since that group is substantially defined by his occupation and
education.”50 Without assurance that inegalitarian insititutions will eventually change, it
is important to assure for oneself and one’s children the chance for a reasonably decent
life.

47

172.
Unger says yes.
49
175.
50
Id.
48
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Cohen thinks this point has some substance: the relative disadvantage problem
suggests that “equality is, necessarily, a social project.” It certainly is unfortunate to be
separated by money from one’s friends, or to consign one’s children to any situation not
maximally capable of promoting their academic, social, athletic, and musical
capabilities.51 The kinds of demands posed by friends and family, both explicit and
implicit, have a great deal of “moral significance.” But whether they are of “comparable
moral significance” to the alleviation of absolute poverty is another matter. For a hard
“do-nothing” position, far from merely accommodating the prevailing ethos of
selfishness in one’s peer group, actually reinforces it.52 One is not merely acting within
an unjust social structure, but promoting its preservation.
It is strange that Cohen does not make this point here, because he brilliantly
conveys it earlier in his book. As Cohen notes, the great liberal fallacy about the site of
distributive justice (particularly in evidence in Rawls) is that “the fundamental principles
of justice apply to the rules of the basic structure of society, and not to the choices people
make within that structure, beyond their choices about whether or not to promote,
support, and comply with the rules of a just basic structure.”53 The liberal position may
have been convincing when we were less aware of the effects of social norms. But the
Rawlsian quest for a just “basic structure” of society, within which individuals have the
greatest liberty compatible with a like liberty for others, becomes ever more misguided as
we understand the cognitive impact of the decisions of neighbors and peers. Even very
personal decisions (such as a driver’s decision to purchase an SUV) have important
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consequences for the justice of a society (by, for example, helping create social norms
that encourage the proliferation of large vehicles).54
A Rawlsian basic structure is not on the political horizon. As even vague and
inferior versions of it recede from the horizon of possibility, personal decisions become
ever more important to the accomplishment of justice. Perhaps one can argue that the
“reinforcement effect” (of capitulating to the consumption standards of one’s peer group)
is so small as to be swamped by the general “relative disadvantage” concern. But I think
it is a powerful argument for at least dropping to a lower level of consumption within
one’s peer group for the sake of aiding the poorest. Conspicuous consumption is simply
unacceptable. Any attempt to gain in prestige merely by consuming more than one’s
peers is always suspect. Perhaps the only respectable relative deprivation arguments boil
down to “self-defeat” or “culturalist” positions—which I explore in sections * below.
3) Special Deprivation: Expensive or Expansive Tastes?
Cohen relates Nagel’s second, social objection to a third one of his own devising:
the special deprivation argument. A “rich egalitarian” reduced to mere petit bourgeoise
status by an aggressive program of giving is likely to feel a “constant sense of
deprivation” unthinkable to one who has lived at that level his entire life.55 Cohen earlier
described this as the problem of “expensive tastes.” To understand the objection more
fully, it is helpful to review a recent philosophical debate over “equality of what:”
welfare, resources, or capabilities.
Philosophers have long debated the degree to which well-being is objective or
subjective. Subjective welfarists believe that individual happiness or utility is the only
54
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reliable guide to well being. Objective virtue theorists believe that well-being consists in
certain practices in all the spheres of human flourishing, including the pursuit of
knowledge, work, love, art, and religion. Neither position is convincing, for neither the
joyful wanton nor the miserably virtuous person seem to be living well.56
Nevertheless, the debate raises important questions in the realm of distributive
justice. Imagine that we could “average out” housing resources, and henceforth everyone
had to live in the situation now prevailing for the “average” resident of earth. Imagine
too that such an “average house” afforded roughly 200 square feet per occupant. While
the previously homeless might be overjoyed at the prospect of stable shelter, those used
to 1000 or more square feet to themselves might find the new arrangements impossible to
take. They have (relatively) “expensive tastes.”57 And while everyone would have equal
resources, subjective welfare would be quite unequal in this situation, given an
endowment effect among the rich and (possibly symmetrically) lower expectations
among the poor.
Of course, we cannot take the endowment effect too seriously or we slide into
absurd “accommodations.” As Amartya Sen points out, there is no reason why we should
give less to a “pleasure wizard” like Tiny Tim (who always appears deliriously happy in
Dickens’ Christmas Carol) in order to compensate for the curmudgeonly anhedonia of a
Scrooge. But here, again, much depends on the source of a Scrooge’s difficulty in
experiencing subjective welfare58 (or, for our purposes, expensive tastes). If the problem
is beyond his control, we may perhaps be justified in granting him some therapy that
renders him better able to experience pleasure. Ceteris paribus, the anhedonic A should
56

Compare also the experience machine, etc (subjective well being in the 2ci48 paper.
Endowment effect Tversky and Kahneman.
58
Not simply pleasure, but also larger forms of satisfaction, etc.
57

20

get the same level of resources as B, plus the therapy that would render him capable of
experiencing pleasure with the same ease as B.59 Less fanciful examples lead Sen to
conclude that what matters is not welfare, or resources, but capabilities—i.e., giving
individuals the resources they need to exercise certain such basic capabilities as walking,
playing, or working. To Sen, we should not care if they’re happy while they’re engaging
in this (broad) range of endeavors—we can only guarantee the pursuit of happiness.
Sen’s capabilities approach would respond to expensive needs, but not expensive tastes.
Cohen resists Sen’s account as too close to the “objective virtue” school.60 He
believes that while both welfare and resources count, and they can’t be reconciled so
neatly into a “capabilities” approach. His residual sympathy for the potential loss of
subjective welfare by those committed to serious giving suggests that he believes they
have some right to continue indulging their expensive tastes even when those tastes
clearly rise above the level of necessity. He admits that he “has not applied that view to
the issues addressed here…reserv[ing] the task of doing so for a future and more
systematically structured study of the ‘rich egalitarian’ problem.”61
In section IV below I try to respond to this call for further research. My effort to
construct a procedural and substantive ethics of consumption draws on religious
traditions of East and West, as well as modern research on the psychology of satisfaction.
I shall argue that we are morally obliged to gradually pare down our expensive tastes in
order to relieve the plight of the poor.62 Sen offered his capabilities approach as a way
of thinking about the problem of redistributing to the poor—that is, of answering hard
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questions about how to deviate from an equal distribution of resources in order to take
care of the special needs of the poor disabled. I think it also has relevance to our way of
thinking about the obligations of those who can give, by suggesting a ceiling for their
consumption—one that provides the secure with a decent range of capabilities, but not
the full menu of choice we now often take for granted.
b) Justifications for Not Giving: The Irrelevance of Charity
1)

“My Giving Would be a Drop in the Ocean”

Although the weight of arguments like Singer’s hangs on an immediate appeal to
our conscience to save starving children, a far more complex and subtle intervention is
really what is being called for. Over the long run, we would not accept a world in which
we are constantly throwing life lines to those drowning in poverty. Compassion fatigue
would justifiably set in.
Of course, in its harshest form, this critique turns into a form of Malthusianism.
Just as Justice Holmes complained that “three generations of idiots are enough,” the
anticipatory-fatigue perspective recoils from supporting generations of marginally
subsistent, dependent individuals. If such a perspective is to rise above cruel
obliviousness, it must be translated into another: namely, that political, not individual
action is a necessary response to present inequities.
Such a political vision probably does animate Singer. His goals must be more
substantive than he lets on.63 They might, for instance, include Roberto Unger’s ideas
about sustainable development, international commerce, and the need to preserve cultural
traditions in the process of development. Since it is this state of affairs that we are truly
after, a rich egalitarian might say, we shouldn’t distract ourselves with “bucket brigades”
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that distract us from figuring out how to get fire trucks to the conflagration. From that
perspective, one may argue that individual giving is simply negligible in comparison with
the total effort necessary to a meaningful response.
But as Cohen reminds us, “‘Negligible’ can mean ‘numerically small, relative to
the total picture,’ but it can also mean ‘unimportant,’ and neglibility in the first of these
senses does not entail negligibility in the second.”64 If the fire trucks don’t exist, the
bucket brigades can at least permit a few more people to escape. I recall once attending a
“Key Club” community service convention in high school where one of the speakers
addressed the “drop in the bucket” problem. He compared our small efforts in soup
kitchens to a man who comes upon a seashore dotted with thousands of dying starfish,
and throws back one each time he goes on a walk. Eventually someone questions him
about the futility of his endeavor. The man replies: “It makes a difference to that
starfish!”
2)

The Real Problem is Unequal Power

Of course, the story is double-edged. It reminds us that we cannot turn away from
the persons in the Save the Children advertisements simply by retreating to a detached
perspective on the futility of the effort to save them. But any argument that relies on an
analogy of the poor to invertebrates is deeply troubling. Many individuals find the very
idea of “charity” morally offensive. As David Wagner argues in What’s Love Got to Do
With It (a critique of American philanthropy), “Charity [has] a clear social script…[of]
heroes and model citizens who give, and deferential and meek citizens who accept.”65 To
an egalitarian, any long-term relationship of dependence of one class upon another is
64
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repugnant. Since poverty relief efforts presuppose a wealthier class helping a poorer one,
they “fail to touch the fundamental injustice, which is the structured inequality of power
between the rich and poor.”66
Serious Marxists once believed in an immiseration hypothesis—namely, that any
effort to ameliorate the plight of the working class short of socialist revolution was
counterproductive because it pacified workers into accepting their fate. Wagner eschews
such a hard line, but does suggest the ways in which charity efforts may end up
perpetuating the situations they seek to alleviate. Analogizing the role of charity
organizations to radical monasteries marginalized by the larger church, Wagner
concludes that
As the major institutions—business and government—comprise the power
structure of society, some idealists are allowed…to work in small outposts of the
empire to feed the homeless, care for the sick, and minister to the wounded. The
more idealistic and different from the dominant organizations a charity is….the
more likely its workers are to be poorly paid or serve as volunteers.
To Wagner, charity work diverts the best efforts of those who might otherwise be making
society more just.
Despite the power of these critiques of charity, they do not touch the fundamental
obligation of persons to do something to promote the well-being of the poor. If a critic of
charity truly believes such activity only delays the “day of reckoning,” he ought to
contribute something to an organization devoted to hastening it. Far from being an
excuse for quiescence, this perspective on the “futility of charity” obliges its adherents to
give even more to politics.
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Of course, the left-wing advocate of equality-through-politics can fight this battle
in many ways—some of which depend on his own high level of consumption. Cohen
himself notes that “since I’m rich, my position in society affords me access to influential
people whose decisions affect the lot of the badly off.” His children, afforded an
excellent education, will, hopefully, share his egalitarian values and use their “privileged
positions” for egalitarian ends. Cohen concedes that the “I-need-to-keep-my-moneyprecisely-in-order-to-promote-egalitarianism justification” “is more credible for the
rather undemocratic politics of the US than for the somewhat…less elitedetermined…politics of Britain.”67 He nevertheless accepts it as self-justification, and
appears to believe that a great number of rich egalitarians can advance it. The position
almost reminds one of the difference principle—(great) deviations from equality can be
justified to the extent that those benefiting need their wealth in order to promote a more
just social order. But it depends on some controversial assumptions about the
relationship between consumption patterns, socialization opportunities, and moral
authority. Certainly Gandhi did not need to consume much to lead a great social
movement.

3) Reasons for Keeping: The Self Defeat of the Charitable Impulse?
a) The First Paradox of Charity: Impeding the Market
Mechanisms that “Lift all Boats?”
The mirror image of the leftist critique of the futility of charity is the libertarian faith
in the power of free markets. The latter position is rapidly becoming the civic religion of
the United States. When not ignoring the problem, most Americans approach global
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inequality with a curious mixture of optimism and fatalism. We hope consumer demand
will somehow permit the poor to earn a decent living. Faith in the invisible hand feeds on
a tacit conviction that “progress” is inevitable and unchannelable.
The dogmatic market stance of Rand, Hayek, or P.T. Bauer is not the only variant on
this position. The social theory and history of Adam Smith also supports such
conservatism. Smith suggested that the nobility’s penchant for “baubles” and other
luxuries was the key reason for the expansion of middle class wealth and power in early
modernity. Stable economic progress depended on an orderly exchange of goods of
resources that gradually sparked a convergence of the living standards of the bourgeoisie
and the nobility. Smith’s history suggests that modernization was inevitably a slow and
arduous process. Efforts to speed it up could have disastrous consequences. Even many
progressives today insist that “trade, not aid” is essential to a stable economic order.
As the US learned in the 1930s and Japan is learning now, thrift is paradoxical: when
too many people save, the entire economy is prone to collapse. Free-marketeers suggest
there may be a similar paradox of charity. Given the enormous complexity of world
trade, it is hard to write off this caution as callousness. Individuals who choose to give
away money, instead of investing it, may be shifting funds from enterprises that would
create permanent and sustainable development instead of mere relief. The shift might
spark a general crisis of confidence that reduced welfare overall. Certainly the current
economic slowdown shows how much economic growth depends on the tenuous reed of
future expectations. As theorists of chaos suggest, a small decision can have immense
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knock-on effects.68 If a butterfly in Bali can cause a hurricane in the Bahamas, perhaps a
foregone pair of Nikes in Indiana can cause a factory shut-down in Indonesia?
Perhaps. But certainly this objection is speculative. A supply-side, investmentoriented theory of economic growth may be popular, but is by no means the consensus
position among economists. As a Keynesian might note, the distribution of money to
people who desperately need to spend it may stimulate the global economy more than
continued accumulation by those who can afford to save. As for the long-term
perspective on modernization: well, as Keynes said, in the long run, we’re all dead.
Libertarians might frame the global economy as a “rising tide that lifts all boats,” but the
rise of intellectual property transactions means that global wealth is increasingly trapped
in ethereal digital transfers, rarely trickling down to the poor. The market is too slow and
unpredictable a mechanism to relieve their suffering.
This is not to suggest that the first paradox of charity can be dismissed out of hand as
an excuse for not giving. But it certainly cannot be advanced as a knock-down case for
keeping. Furthermore, to the extent that the first paradox of charity depends on the logic
of “what if everyone gives away money instead of spending it,” it is irrelevant. We are in
no danger of an epidemic of tithing. Given the narrow circulation of Singer’s and
Unger’s ideas, each person must respond to them on the basis of their potential marginal
contribution to relief, and not from universalizing speculations on what would result “if
everyone does this.”
b) The Second Paradox of Charity: Destroying Indigenous
Cultures While Inducing Dependence?
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Almost since the beginning of foreign aid programs, critics have argued that relief
is self-defeating. Instead of engaging the world’s poor in productive activity, aid induces
them to depend on outside interventions. Aid organizations like the World Bank and
IMF are increasingly cautious about interventions. Sudanese refugees, for instance,
appear to have ceased farming because of a steady flow of airlifted food.69 Meanwhile,
some inefficient and even brutal regimes are arguably kept from collapsing by outside
charity.
Although these arguments are eerily reminiscent of conservative “welfare reform”
within developed nations, other critics have complemented them with worries over the
effect of aid on culture. Wendell Berry has explained how the human right of
“reproductive freedom,” as instantiated in condom distribution programs in rural
Pakistan, helped upset the “natural balance” of customary sexual relations.70 “Efforts to
help” may merely throw into high relief the deprivation of those aided, reducing their
levels of satisfaction overall.71
These are valid criticisms of certain kinds of aid to the poor, but certainly not of
aid-as-such. It is unfortunate that the Sudanese stopped farming when aid arrived, but
isn’t their position analogous to that of a woman on welfare who hopes to complete a
high school education before going to work, instead of being forced into a dead-end job
immediately? As the leader of one of the world’s leading relief organizations has
observed,
Many people, perhaps the majority today, do not have the means which would
enable them to take their place in an effective and humanly dignified way within a
productive system in which work is truly central. They have no possibility of
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acquiring the basic knowledge which would enable them to express their
creativity and develop their potential.72
If these desperately impoverished persons are trying to leverage a foreign intervention
into a permanent advance in living standards, who can blame them? It makes more sense
to blame those intervening if they fail to provide a sustained commitment to
development. Even if that intervention fails, it certainly is not an argument for not
intervening at all. Rather, it should simply stand as a reminder to givers to assure they
direct their money to the most efficient relief and reform organizations.
The cultural argument also rings hollow. Certainly it should give us pause before
we send off missionaries to unexplored corners of Africa or South America. But by and
large the relevant poor “crowd the cities of the Third World where they are often without
cultural roots and are exposed to situations of violent uncertainty with no possibility of
becoming integrated.”73 People by and large need a basic level of security before they
can enjoy and propagate their culture.74 We should not deny the vast majority of the
world’s poor the opportunity to do so based on romantic notions about “tribes” untouched
by civilization. And if we seriously believe that charity efforts ignore the political
dimension of poverty, we should allocate funds to those organizations which address it.
D) A Summary of the lessons of Singer, Unger, and Cohen
Singer, Unger, and Cohen each treat our present neglect of the world’s poorest as
a great collective and individual moral failing. As Stuart Hampshire observes in a
passage on the nature of moral blindness, “No doubt our grandchildren will ask, ‘How
can they have failed to see the injustice of allowing billionaires to multiply while the very
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same economy allowed abject poverty to persist uncorrected next-door to preposterous
luxury?’”75 Each of the utilitarians argues that systematic concern for the world’s poorest
should become part of our everyday consumption decisions. They demonstrate that we
need to be more systematic about our finances in general in order to think more clearly
about what we can give to the poor. Although Unger’s extreme positions are implausible,
Singer’s tithing ethics are a model method of responding to the crisis of absolute poverty.
Given the speciousness of nearly all of the arguments against charity which Cohen
entertained, we can conclude with Singer that we are obliged to give to the poor. His
Principle of Obligation stands: “If it is in our power to prevent something very bad from
happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral significance, we
ought to do it…”76
But once we decide to tithe, how much should we allocate to this cause? Much
depends on how we define obligations of “comparable moral significance.” Critics of
Singer have defined these rival claims very broadly. More importantly, they have argued
that many of our obligations are duties incomparable with the claims of the poor but
nevertheless imperative upon us. Whether they can discredit Singer’s principle of
obligation under the banner of incommensurability is the topic of the next section.
III. The Remaining Critiques: Material Needs of Dependents and Incommensurable
Immaterial Aspirations
Unger and Singer try to convince us of their moral principles with a number of
hypotheticals. They focus on cases where there is a clear moral, if no legal, duty to
rescue. If one were to witness a child drowning in a shallow pond, such that all one
would need to do to save him would be to ruin one’s $300 suit, one would be a moral
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monster not to. Why then not give $300 to a reputable charitable organization which will
save four people from dying for the same amount? They systematically consider efforts
to distinguish the situations, but reject them all on philosophical grounds.
Critics contend that such hypotheticals cannot be applied to our daily
decisionmaking. Peter Berkowitz offers one of the most probing and eloquent responses
to the utilitarians’ moral demands. Berkowitz argues that analogies like Singer’s and
Unger’s mislead us because they ignore the complexity of moral life. Consider again the
story of Bob’s Bugatti (as retold by Berkowitz):
Bob is close to retirement. He has invested most of his savings in a very rare and
valuable old car, a Bugatti, which he has not been able to insure…In addition to the
pleasure he gets from driving and caring for his car, Bob knows that its rising market
value means that he will always be able to sell it and live comfortably after
retirement. One day when Bob is out for a drive, he parks the Bugatti near the end of
a railway siding and goes for a walk up the track. As he does so, he sees that a
runaway train, with no one aboard, is running down the railway track. Looking farther
down the track, he sees the small figure of a child very likely to be killed by the
runaway train. He can't stop the train and the child is too far away to warn of the
danger, but he can throw a switch that will divert the train down the siding where his
Bugatti is parked. Then nobody will be killed--but the train will destroy his Bugatti.
Thinking of his joy in owning the car and the financial security it represents, Bob
decides not to throw the switch. The child is killed. For many years to come, Bob
enjoys owning his Bugatti and the financial security it represents.77
Unger would have us believe that, each time we fail to sacrifice some of our disposable
income for the relief of the poorest, we act like Bob. But, as Berkowitz notes, the
example “radically simplifies matters:”
Bob appears to be wifeless, childless, parentless, and friendless. And Bob appears to
have only two choices: he can save his prized possession and personal fortune, which
will allow the child to die, or, saving the child, Bob can allow his financial security to
be wiped out…To replicate the situation in which we actually find ourselves, [the]
example would not only have to allow degrees of generosity, it would also have to
incorporate a variety of factors and recognize a range of tradeoffs.
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Berkowitz notes that “in our lives we must balance sacrifices in personal wealth against,
among other things, the kind of injuries that we can practicably prevent, the number of
innocent sufferers involved, the proximity of those in need to us, and the cost of our
benevolence to those whom we love and with whom we share our lives.”78 Without
considering all the potential tradeoffs involved, Berkowitz suggests, the moral intuitions
of an Unger or a Singer are worthless as practical guides to action.
Nevertheless, awareness of the “many textures and myriad colors of the moral life”79
does not force us to reject the moral force of these admittedly abstract hypotheticals.
Once we do flesh them out, we find that there are two main kinds of obligations that
stand in the way of more giving to the poor: the material claims of family and
dependents, and non-material goals that are simply incommensurable with the utilitarian
concern with the welfare of the poorest. I discuss each of these rival claims below.
A) The Material Needs of Relations
As mentioned above, some of the utilitarian advocates of quantified charitable
burdens are merciless in their demands from the wealthy. Peter Unger criticizes those
who send their children to private school, since “by not spending thousands annually on
tuition, you’ll send thousands more to the likes of UNICEF and, thus, you’ll see to it that
fewer vulnerable youngsters die painfully and prematurely.”80 He probably would be
little impressed by Cohen’s argument that well-brought-up children with egalitarian
values are more likely to do more to promote them in the world. But Unger does not
acknowledge how he educates his own children. And recently Peter Singer has confessed
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that, in violation of his own precepts, he spends thousands of dollars each year to care for
his ailing mother—money that would, by his own account, be better spent in preventing
multiple deaths in the poorest regions of the world.
Unger attempts to deconstruct the intuitions that lead us to approve of Singer’s
conduct, but with little success.81 The demands and needs of family surpass reason and
impartiality. To deny one’s children an upbringing at least as good as one’s own, or to
deny one’s parents life-extending health care (or even small luxuries at the end of life)
roils the conscience. To do so in the name of morality seems perverse, since our relations
are often the strongest of our “moral sources:” inculcators of the habits and attitudes most
central to a moral life, including the capacity to love and to empathize.82
And yet obligations to family have their limits. No one can deny that a great number
of children grow up spoiled, or that the default medical obligation to intervene near the
very end of life effectively allocates hundreds of millions of health care dollars from
preventive care to a cause that looks like little more than the extension of suffering. Such
improper allocations of resources result from our unwillingness to think clearly about
what we need and what we owe one another.83 When the very poor drop off our moral
map, we can grow myopic about our obligations to those nearest us. I would like to
propose some guidelines, both substantive and procedural, to bring us closer to a true
brotherhood of man.84 Although they may seem unduly harsh or unrealistic in personal
relations, they are also meant to serve as guides to societal allocations of resources—
where they might be put into practice with less controversy.
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1) The Limits of Children’s Obligations to Parents: An Investment
Theory
As medical interventions become more sophisticated and complex, growing numbers
of persons face a dilemma as their parents age. Decent nursing home or other care may
cost $80,000 per year. Drug costs can easily reach $3,000 per month. Is a child obliged
to take care of whatever medical or other needs arise, even to the exclusion of obligations
to charity?85 When the medical profession declares death itself a disease, how much
spending on life-extension is merited?86 As living standards diverge, it is easy to imagine
citizens of the first world locked into obligations to provide for one another’s “needs”-needs that are unimaginable luxuries in the third world.
I believe that one can only understand the problem in terms of a larger social
transformation in the delivery of health care. While citizens of the US used to expect that
programs like Medicaid and Medicare would fully fund their health needs in retirement,
societal commitments in this area are slowly being rolled back. We will likely evolve (or
regress) to a point where the only guarantee of health care is the individual purchase of
long-term health care insurance.
As we transition to this state, adults are still obliged to provide care for their
parents when they need it. But they cannot simply ignore the needs of those who are
much poorer, and who have not even had a chance at the experiences enjoyed (or offered)
to them or their parents. To reconcile the two obligations, a person might calculate how
much a needy parent would have made had they invested all the money they spent raising
the person in some kind of medical savings account or cognate scheme. The amount due
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from the adult child would then nearly match what the parent would receive had the
parent fully internalized the cost of care.
Obviously these calculations are difficult and complex. They would be more
humanely disposed of via a collective, political process. But we are moving further away
from such patterns of mutual aid with each passing year. With the devolution of power to
individuals comes the devolution of responsibility. As difficult as quantifying our
obligations to parents might be, it is certainly less morally irresponsible than simply
spending without limit to support them, when the costs of preserving life in the third
world are so much lower.
2) The Limits of Parents’ Obligations to Children: An Opportunity
Theory
The situation facing parents at the beginning of their children’s life is less grim
than that facing adults at the end of a parent’s life. But the moral dilemmas are no less
real. A child has nearly unlimited opportunities to cultivate her academic, athletic,
musical and other abilities—opportunities that quickly diminish as she ages. The costs of
a proper education are enormous—and far less than what we as a society customarily put
into public schools. Nevertheless, can a parent spend money on, say, soccer lessons, in
good conscience, when she knows that the relevant soccer balls may well have been sewn
by child labor?87
Like medical costs for the elderly, the costs of education are likely to expand even
more over time. In determining the limits of (monetary expressions of) one’s love for
one’s children, frank consideration of the claims of the poorest is essential. Although
there is no easy way to quantify a ceiling of educational expenditures for one’s children, a
87
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conscientious parent may ask: what are the preconditions for avoiding a future caste
system in which my progeny do not even think of the poor? How can I assure that my
own deliberations about their plight are a part of my children’s moral life?
Any realistic answer would at least include the following condition: with hard
work and application, the most intelligent among the poorest within one’s community
would be able to attend the educational institution to which one sends one’s children.
Like the “class-mixing” proposed by Mickey Kaus to combat the pernicious effects of
“assortative mating,” the permeability of educational institutions to those who started
with little in part legitimizes their role in providing the wealthy the opportunity to
continue to have a lot.88 A continuing commitment to scholarships and other forms of
financial aid is further evidence of an institution’s willingness to end the patterns of
segregation that leave the poor invisible to us. Any favoritism for “legacies” can only be
justified economically, as a method for inducing contributions that make the institution
more open to the poor.
3) Deliberative Preconditions for Moral Choice
Admittedly, each of the guidelines I have thus far proposed is fuzzy and
imprecise. But they play some role in at least conditioning us to think about the poorest
as we make our consumption decisions. Is there any other way to refine our deliberations
in this manner? Certainly one first step is to budget our contributions to charity annually.
I recall being shocked, after reading Unger’s book, to realize that I had likely spent more
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money on coffee and desserts in the year before than I had on charity. To budget from an
annual perspective at least saves one the embarrassment of that kind of distortion.
There are also ways of formalizing Singer’s intuitions. Philosophy may be
thought of as a map, alerting us to the morally salient aspects of our decisions while
downplaying less important aspects. If conceived in this way, we might usually consider
our moral obligations to others as a function of both their need and their relatedness to us:

We are presently comfortable with the idea that there is a group of people (our family and
closest friends) about whom we are obliged to care no matter what their level of material
well-being. (The inhabit the zone marked by horizontal lines in the chart above.) Can we
not also feel obliged to do something for those whose need is particularly great, no matter
what their degree of relatedness is (i.e., those who occupy the zone marked by vertical
lines)? In other words, isn’t their common humanity and uncommon suffering enough to
command our attention?
If so, we must refine our existential choices. Following Martha Nussbaum in the
Fragility of Goodness, we can suggest the characteristic deliberation accompanying a
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good choice. The literature of existential choice has long denoted the seriousness of a
commitment by contrasting it with a rival claim of family or love. Aeneas can either stay
with Dido in Carthage or build Rome. Agamemnon can either keep his position as
commander, or sacrifice his daughter Iphigenia. Sartre’s hypothetical soldier/son can
either fight in the resistance, or stay home and take care of his mother. All these
characters face well-nigh impossible choices between duty and family. To present the
immediacy of an “intrinsically good” choice, the existentialist philosopher or dramatist
juxtaposes it with a duty to family.89
I think that the extreme need of the poor is just as morally relevant to our
decisionmaking as the demands of our family. Just as we consider our children’s or
needy parents’ interests when we make an important life decision, we should consider the
plight of the most disadvantaged.90 For existential choice—where the choice is less a
matter of expressing one’s ethical commitments, than of constituting and crystallizing a
muddy area of them—is an inescapable element of our allocation of resources between
those near to and far from us. These choices have deep moral significance, with valences
we presently ignore or overlook. Squarely facing their consequences is the first step
toward making better ones.
B) Incommensurable Immaterial Aspirations
Colin McGinn’s scathing review of Unger’s book repeatedly faults him for failing
to take into account the diversity of goods. As McGinn writes,
If we really lived by the principle that enjoins each of us to reduce our standard of
living to such a point that nobody was better off than we were, by donating most
89
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of our income to charity…we would be forbidden to…pursue the arts and
sciences, to engage in any form of recreation that costs money, and so on.
McGinn considers such a stricture prima facie absurd. We can dismiss some of
McGinn’s objections as melodramatic at the outset—the harshness of the perfected
application of Unger’s principle should not render its partial instantiation risible. But
they raise two larger points important even to those who sympathize with Unger’s
position. The first has to do with the utilitarian penchant for instrumentalizing all
experiences. The second relates to the inarticulate, ultimate goals behind the utilitarian
project. Consideration of each leads to refinements in our notion of a proper charitable
burden.
1) Utilitarianism and Time: Ignoring the Value of One’s Non-Charitable
Experience for Oneself
As Singer acknowledges, a utilitarian is constantly concerned with the
consequences of actions—and not necessarily with the actions themselves. This futureorientation is a step away from wantonness.91 But it also plays on some of our worst
psychological traits. As Pascal explains,
Let each of us examine his thoughts; he will find them wholly concerned with the
past or the future. We almost never think of the present, and if we do think of it,
it is only to see what light it throws on our plans for the future. The present is
never our end. The past and the present are our means, the future alone our end.
Thus we never actually live, but hope to live, and since we are always planning
how to be happy, it is inevitable that we should never be so.92
Some eastern religious traditions offer similar lessons, and counsel us to live in the
present.93 Many practitioners of Vipassana Buddhism further claim that the daily
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practice of meditation permits one to be more empathic to the needs of others.94 To urge
a constant future orientation risks some of the cultural practices—and sheer capacity for
relaxation!—that dispose us to care about the poor. What we ultimately want for the
most disadvantaged is not simply adequate food and shelter, but lives more like ours.
I mean this not in a concrete, culturally imperialistic sense, but in a more general
way: as lives full of opportunities for knowledge, play, love, meaningful (or at least
engaging) work, and leisure.95 In order to want others to have better lives, we need to
like our own. Individuals of the first world have something approaching a right to the
kinds of art, religion, inquiry, and leisure that make their lives worthwhile—even if these
activities demand sacrifices of time or effort that could be allocated to the poor. But they
also have a duty to balance these immaterial aspirations against some consideration of the
most pressing material needs of the poor.96 Just as Sartre’s would-be soldier considered
the needs of his ailing mother when deciding whether to join the resistance, we are
morally obliged at least to consider the needs of the poorest before we make a substantial
commitment of our resources to any cultural endeavor—ranging from a Muslim’s
pilgrimage to Mecca to a secular hedonist’s purchase of a big-screen television.97
2) Utilitarianism as Reductionism: Ignoring the Value of One’s NonCharitable Contributions to the Community
Unger’s objections to prevailing norms of charitable giving depend on the classic
“utilitarian injunction to maximize the sum of value” in the world, which “implies…[a]
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reductionist claim that there is one ‘stuff’ of value to which all other values can be
reduced, and this ‘stuff’ is what we sum when we maximize.”98 Unger might say he
simply wants us to take unnecessary suffering seriously. But his personal demands
clearly force individuals to “fraternize incompatibles” by weighing such things as
vocational choice or avocational pursuit against the opportunity to earn more money in
order to give it charity.99 Recalling Wittgenstein’s advice to his students, Unger tries to
persuade most of his philosophy graduate students to give up their studies in order to
make money and donate it.100 He appears oblivious to the autonomous claims of art,
religion, or other cultural pursuits.
The same problem of incommensurability arises for Singer’s tithe ethics, if less
dramatically. The opportunity cost of donating one’s money to charity is sacrificing
one’s ability to influence other spheres with it. The conflict raises what I like to call
Gresham's Law of Commerce: Those persons who devote the most time to profitable
activity and investment are most likely to succeed economically and wield that market
power over other spheres. So to give to the poor is not simply to sacrifice one’s wealth.
It is to sacrifice one’s power—power to influence the spheres of art, education, politics or
religion. Achievement or influence in these realms is incommensurable with the
prevention of death—indeed, many of our greatest cultural leaders in effect gave their
lives to their works.
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Of course, one can “fit” these experiences into the utilitarian scheme by taking a
slightly longer-term view of the problem and realizing the benign influence they might
have on the experiencer.101 Rather than urging immediate self-sacrifice in order to help
the poor, Unger endorses prudential judgments: "a successful entrepreneur must commit
his profits to a judicious mix of efficient business investment in efficient lessening of
serious suffering; then he'll do all he can to lessen the serious suffering of others, taking
into account the shorter and longer terms.”102 By the same token, a successful utilitarian
“moral entrepreneur” can take into account the shorter and longer terms by urging
individuals to support those cultural institutions that render people more capable of
hearing the egalitarian message.
Many cultural activities, or exposure to a broader world community, render a
person more sympathetic to the needs of the poor. Bill Gates presently outspends the
entire US government in fighting tropical diseases. He became aware of the problem in
part because of a vacation he made to South America during his twenties--for the first
time he was directly present to massive poverty, and vowed to do something about it. To
resist other entrepreneurs’ trips to such regions would be self-defeating.
Of course, this response merely sidesteps the incommensurability critique.
Beyond all consideration of potential moralizing effects of various non-necessary
purchases and experiences is a strictly cultural critique of utilitarian strictures. Even
cultural traditions with avowedly expansive principles of charitable giving draw the line
somewhere. For example, there is the famous passage in the New Testament where Jesus
commends a women for perfuming his feet (when his desciples said she should have sold
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the perfume to donate the proceeds to charity): "The poor you'll always have with you;
I'll not always be with you." Although parallel concerns for the autonomy of culture and
art can mestastasize into Nietzschean decadence, they nevertheless caution us against
putting every activity to the test of whether it improves the lot of the least advantaged.
But again, as Charles Taylor has pointed out, the conflict may not be so sharp.103
Singer’s holistic, utilitarian perspective is deeply indebted to certain cultural traditions
and practices. Certainly there is a conflict when I am deciding whether to give $10 to
restore my church or to Oxfam’s relief efforts. But the church (at its best) is itself one of
the main instruments for cultivating compassion and universal benevolence among all
strata of society.104 The decision to support the church (and many other cultural
institutions) can in many ways be analogized (in utilitarian terms) to the decision by an
entrepreneur not to give away all of his funds but to invest some of them in order to do
more good in the future.105 As Charles Taylor suggests, our present conceptions of what
it is to be human, of moral obligation, and of personal responsibility, are the result of the
delicate balance of commitments and sensibilities that have both secular and religious,
artistic and governmental roots. That we are the kind of persons who can take Singer's
book seriously depends on the cultivation and advancement of many cultural forms.
Furthermore, when we have a properly ecological sense of culture, we realize just had
delicate interplay of all parts is. As Taylor suggests in his recent lecture “A Catholic
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Modernity?”, a sustainable affirmation of worldwide movements of solidarity and
support (saving life at great cost) may be predicated on a belief in life beyond death.
The question, of course, is whether we want or need to justify all cultural forms
with some reference to their ultimate impact on relieving the suffering of the poorest in
the world today.106 Although I risk skirting the moral absolutism of the late Tolstoy, I
believe the answer is yes. I would find any religion which did not include such an idea
among its central tenets entirely implausible.107 I only respect libertarians who connect
their advocacy of laissez-faire to some story about the way in which unfettered private
transactions are the quickest route to development.108 And while I disagree with
Adorno’s verdict that “no poems can be written after Auschwitz,” I believe that any artist
or scholar who entirely ignores the great suffering in our midst is simply not serious.
The incommensurabilist critics of Singer, Unger, and Cohen essentially attack
straw men. They question is not: “Is any spending on non-charitable culture permitted?”
but rather, “Is a failure to give a nontrivial percentage of one’s income (above a certain
point) to charity morally problematic?” To presume that a moral obligation to some
charitable giving is tantamount to an obligation to completely abandon all non-charitable
activities is a self-serving reductio ad absurdum worthy of the Pharisees.
IV. The Next Step for Quantifying Charitable Burdens: An Ethics of Consumption
These high-flown reflections on ordering the pursuit of truth and beauty to the
demands of justice are only relevant to the boundaries of utilitarian demands—not their
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main substance. They contain Unger’s maximalism, but have little to do with Singer’s
“Principle of Obligation.”109 Putting the principle into practice simply in the realm of our
lives as consumers would do much to advance the welfare of the poorest.
Unfortunately, Singer does not provide us with concrete principles for guiding
that process. He does not even attempt to draw a line between necessity, convenience,
and luxury—essential distinctions for those urging others to avoid “unnecessary”
consumption. Wishing to avoid absolute and concrete claims, he leaves his proposal
unsatisfyingly unspecified. Singer has proven our moral obligation to donate a portion of
our income to NGO’s serving the world’s poorest. But his deliberate eschewal of virtue
ethics leaves him ill-equipped to tell us how much is necessary.
This kind of “argumentative abstinence” is unnecessary, and indeed must be
replaced with an ethic of consumption and charity in order to give utilitarian ideas real
weight and force. There is some middle ground between the saintly rigor of an Elie
Wiesel (who has said that "our lives belong to those who need them most") and the
unreflective materialism so common in developed countries. We can find it by
articulating a procedural and substantive ethics of consumption, drawing on religious
traditions of East and West, as well as modern research on the psychology of
satisfaction.110
We are morally obliged to gradually pare down our expensive tastes in order to
relieve the plight of the poor—not simply for their sake, but for ours.111 It is simply
grotesque to juxtapose the “epidemic” of obesity in the US with malnutrition in the third
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world—but the two problems are intimately related.112 The level of GDP spent on
indisputably harmful things—such as tobacco, alcohol, and firearms—dwarfs our level of
giving to the poor.113 Meanwhile, even self-avowed Christians on average spend more
money on pet food and sporting goods than they allocate to church-based poverty relief
efforts.114
Amartya Sen offered his capabilities approach as a way of thinking about the
problem of redistributing to the poor—that is, of answering hard questions about how to
deviate from an equal distribution of resources in order to take care of the special needs
of the poor disabled. I think it also has relevance to our way of thinking about the
obligations of those who can give, by suggesting a ceiling for their consumption—one
that provides the secure with a decent range of capabilities, but not the full menu of
choice now often taken for granted.
Of course, any precise line-drawing will draw legitimate protest. I am not about
to pronounce upon whether one or two or three televisions are enough for a two-person
household. Furthermore, the problem of expensive tastes is real and means that the
calibration of needs, conveniences, and luxuries is a dynamic, subjective process. Even
religious orders that pride themselves on egalitarianism realize this and pace the adoption
of vows of poverty accordingly.115 If we are to take tithing ethics seriously but
realistically, we cannot insist on a leveling of living standards. Instead, we can only offer
heuristics designed to move individuals gradually, asymptotically, toward an ideal of
selflessness. These can be very humble. Some suggest spending the same amount on
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charity as one spends on gifts.116 Others employ a “yoking map,” which commits them to
advance the welfare of a particular impoverished place or person.117
The beauty of this process is that it can be justified entirely with reference to the
effects on the giver. Although critics have suggested that Singer’s ethic might lead to
demoralizing self-instrumentalization, the “practices of the self”118 required to advance it
are in fact a way of defying such an outcome. The freer we are from the need to
consume, the less our vocational and personal choices hinge on the maintenance of a
certain lifestyle.119 We move from having to being—from accumulating things to
appreciating the present. In other words, the utilitarian advocates of tithing ethics can
supplement their consequentialism with an account of the good that tithing does for the
giver.120
V. Conclusion
Consider a fearful symmetry of 1998. As surgeons in France perfected the first
human hand transplant, rebels in Sierra Leone terrorized opponents by cutting off their
hands.121 As the “First World” chalked up yet another technological achievement, yet
another part of the third world slipped into anarchy. Such juxtapositions indicate the
breadth of the divergence of world living standards.122
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Perhaps the new technology might someday be used for the poor as well as the
rich. Certainly as productivity in developed nations grows, we can expect more of our
surplus to be charity for less developed countries. Many progressive economists would
insist that even the most baroque contemporary technologies play some role in fueling a
global economy that will eventually benefit all. The hand surgeon may eventually
volunteer for Medecins sans Frontieres.
But one can tell a different story about technology—indeed, a story more
expressive of the practices of inequality now manifest in the global economy.
Worldwide, more than 1 billion people live on less than $1 a day. As their lives,
practices, and concerns grow more distant from our own it is easy to imagine the flagging
of worldwide movements of sympathy and practical solidarity. Technology can either
help knit the world together or entrench existing inequalities ever more deeply.
Political institutions can do little to advance either outcome. Individuals who care
must start taking personal responsibility. As the competitive pressures of globalization
compel national governments to reduce taxation levels, and more and more public duties
are undertaken by international institutions lacking a tax base, systematic voluntary
giving will take on increasing importance in relieving suffering and remedying absolute
poverty. If these functions are to be performed well by NGO's in the future, they will
need steady and widespread financial support. Well-off citizens are collectively
responsible for providing it.
Considering the moral force of such global obligations, Stanley Hoffman
concluded that “our state of conscience is somewhere between the argument that we owe
nothing, except a dole, to those outside our community, and the argument that we owe the
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same thing, full justice, to all mankind.”123 I hope the foregoing reflections have proven
that most of us need to move towards the latter position. By revising and extending
Unger’s, Singer’s, and Cohen’s efforts to connect political philosophy to personal
behavior, I have presented a case for systematic giving and methods for quantifying that
burden. The relief of absolute poverty is an enormous and complex endeavor.
Nevertheless, it is an indispensable part of any life well lived, and any “coherent social
faith,” of our age.
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